第6篇：虚实篇
孙子兵法
Sun Tzu’s
THE ART OF WAR
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首页
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[
虚实篇
](#xushi)
目录 1 [
始计篇
](/chapter-1-laying-plans/)
2 [
作战篇
](/chapter-2-waging-war/)
3 [
谋攻篇
](/chapter-3-attack-by-stratagem/)
4 [
军形篇
](/chapter-4-tactical-dispositions/)
5 [
兵势篇
](/chapter-5-energy/)
6 [
虚实篇
](/chapter-6-weak-points-and-strong/)
7 [
军争篇
](/chapter-7-maneuvering/)
8 [
九变篇
](/chapter-8-variation-in-tactics/)
9 [
行军篇
](/chapter-9-the-army-on-the-march/)
10 [
地形篇
](/chapter-10-terrain/)
11 [
九地篇
](/chapter-11-the-nine-situations/)
12 [
火攻篇
](/chapter-12-the-attack-by-fire/)
13 [
用间篇
](/chapter-13-the-use-of-spies/)
孙子兵法
Sun Tzu’s
THE ART OF WAR
[
首页
](/)
[
虚实篇
](#xushi)
目录 1 [
始计篇
](/chapter-1-laying-plans/)
2 [
作战篇
](/chapter-2-waging-war/)
3 [
谋攻篇
](/chapter-3-attack-by-stratagem/)
4 [
军形篇
](/chapter-4-tactical-dispositions/)
5 [
兵势篇
](/chapter-5-energy/)
6 [
虚实篇
](/chapter-6-weak-points-and-strong/)
7 [
军争篇
](/chapter-7-maneuvering/)
8 [
九变篇
](/chapter-8-variation-in-tactics/)
9 [
行军篇
](/chapter-9-the-army-on-the-march/)
10 [
地形篇
](/chapter-10-terrain/)
11 [
九地篇
](/chapter-11-the-nine-situations/)
12 [
火攻篇
](/chapter-12-the-attack-by-fire/)
13 [
用间篇
](/chapter-13-the-use-of-spies/)
《孙子兵法·虚实篇》 孙子曰：凡先处战地而待敌者佚，后处战地而趋战者劳，故善战者，致人而不致于人。能使敌人自至者，利之也；能使敌人不得至者，害之也，故敌佚能劳之，饱能饥之，安能动之。出其所不趋，趋其所不意。行千里而不劳者，行于无人之地也。
攻而必取者，攻其所不守也；守而必固者，守其所不攻也。故善攻者，敌不知其所守；善守者，敌不知其所攻。微乎微乎，至于无形。神乎神乎，至于无声，故能为敌之司命。进而不可御者，冲其虚也；退而不可追者。速而不可及也。故我欲战，敌虽高垒深沟，不得不与我战者，攻其所必救也；我不欲战，画地而守之，敌不得与我战者，乖其所之也。
故形人而我无形，则我专而敌分。我专为一，敌分为十，是以十攻其一也，则我众而敌寡；能以众击寡者，则吾之所与战者，约矣。吾所与战之地不可知，不可知，则敌所备者多；敌所备者多，则吾所与战者，寡矣。
故备前则后寡，备后则前寡，备左则右寡，备右则左寡，无所不备，则无所不寡。寡者，备人者也；众者，使人备己者也。
故知战之地，知战之日，则可千里而会战。不知战地，不知战日，则左不能救右，右不能救左，前不能救后，后不能救前，而况远者数十里，近者数里乎？
以吾度之，越人之兵虽多，亦奚益于胜败哉？故曰：胜可为也。敌虽众，可使无斗。故策之而知得失之计，作之而知动静之理，形之而知死生之地，角之而知有余不足之处。故形兵之极，至于无形。无形，则深间不能窥，智者不能谋。因形而错胜于众，众不能知；人皆知我所以胜之形，而莫知吾所以制胜之形。故其战胜不复，而应形于无穷。
夫兵形象水，水之形，避高而趋下，兵之形，避实而击虚。水因地而制流，兵因敌而制胜。故兵无常势，水无常形，能因敌变化而取胜者，谓之神。
故五行无常胜，四时无常位，日有短长，月有死生。
白话译文： 孙子说：凡先到战地而等待敌人的就从容、主动，后到战地而仓促应战的就疲劳、被动。所以，善于指挥作战的人，能调动敌人而不被敌人所调动。能使敌人自己来上钩的，是以小利引诱的结果；能使敌人不能到达其预定地域的，是以各种方法阻碍的结果。所以，敌人休整得好，能设法使它疲劳；敌人给养充分，能设法使它饥饿；敌军驻扎安稳，能够使它移动。
出兵要指向敌人无法救援的地方，行动要在敌人意料不到的方向。行军千里而不疲困的，是因为行进在没有敌人及其没有设防的地区。进攻必然得手的，是因为攻击敌人不注意防守或不易守往的地方；防守必然巩固的，是因为扼守敌人不敢攻或不易攻破的地方。所以，善于进攻的，能使敌人不知怎样防守；善于防御的，敌人不知道怎样进攻。微妙呀！微妙到看不出一点形迹；神奇呀！神奇到听不出一点声息。这样，就能主宰敌人的命运。
前进时，敌人无法抵御的，是因为冲击敌人空虚的地方；退却时，敌人无法追及的，是因为退得迅速使敌人追赶不上。所以，我若求战，敌人即使坚守深沟高垒，也不得不出来与我交战，是由于进攻敌人所必救的地方；我若不想交战，即使画地而守，敌人也无法和我交战，是因为我设法改变了敌人的进攻方向。
所以，用示形的办法欺骗敌人，诱使其暴露企图，而自己不露形迹，使敌人捉摸不定，就能够做到自己兵力集中而使敌人兵力分散；我军兵力集中于一处，敌人兵力分散于十处，我就能以十倍于敌的兵力打击敌人，造成我众而敌寡的有利态势；能做到以众击寡，那么与我军直接交战的敌人就少了。我们所要进攻的地方使敌人不知道：不知道，它就要处处防备；敌人防备的地方越多，兵力越分散，这样，我所直接攻击的敌人就不多了。
所以，注意防备前面，后面的兵力就薄弱；注意防备后面，前面的兵力就薄弱；注意防备左翼，右翼的兵力就薄弱；注意防备右翼，左翼的兵力就薄弱；处处防备，就处处兵力薄弱。敌人兵力所以少，是由于处处防备的结果；我方兵力所以多，是由于迫使敌人分兵防我的结果。
能预料同敌“交战的地点，能预料同敌人交战的时间，就是跋涉千里也可同敌人交战，如果既不能预料交战的地点，又不能预料交战的日期，就会左不能救右，右不能救左，前不能救后，后不能救前，何况远到几十里，近的也有好几里呢！
依我分析，越国的兵虽多，对于决定战争的胜败又有什么补益呢？所以说，胜利是可以争取到的。敌军虽多，也可以使具无法用全部力量与我交战。
所以要认真分析判断，以求明了敌人作战计划的优劣长短；挑动敌人，以求了解其行动的规律；示形诱敌，以求摸清其所处地形的有利与不利；进行战斗侦察，以求探明敌人兵力部署的虚实强弱。
所以，示形诱敌的方法运用到极妙的程度，能使人们看不出一点形迹，看不出一点形迹，即使有深藏的间谍，也无法探明我方的虚实，即使很高明的敌人，也想不出对付我的办法来。
根据敌情而取胜，把胜利摆在众人面前，众人还是看不出来。人们只知道我是根据敌情变化取胜的，但是不知道我是怎样根据敌情变化取胜的。所以每次战胜，都不是重复老一套的方法，而是适应不同的情况，变化无穷。
用兵的规律像水，水流动的规律是避开高处而向低处奔流，用兵的规律是避开敌人坚实之处而攻击其虚弱的地方。水因地势的高下而制约其流向，作战则根据敌情而决定取胜的方针。所以，作战没有固定不变的方式方法，就像水流没有固定的形态一样；能依据敌情变化而取胜的，就称得上用兵如神了。
用兵的规律就像自然现象一样，“五行”相生相克，四季依次交替，白天有短有长，月亮有缺有圆，永远处于变化之中。
英语译文： #### Chapter 6: Weak Points and Strong Sun Tzu said:
In warfare, those who arrive first at the battlefield and await the enemy are at ease and hold the initiative; those who arrive later and rush into battle are weary and disadvantaged. Therefore, those skilled in warfare can make the enemy move, while not being moved by the enemy. They lure the enemy with small gains so that the enemy comes of its own accord; they hinder the enemy in various ways so that it cannot reach its intended destination. Thus, if the enemy is well-rested, one can make it weary; if it is well-supplied, one can make it hungry; if it is securely encamped, one can force it to move.
March toward positions the enemy cannot relieve, and move in directions the enemy does not expect. To march a thousand li without exhaustion is to move through areas where there are no enemies or defenses. An attack is certain to succeed when it strikes places the enemy does not guard or cannot easily defend; defense is certain to hold when one guards places the enemy dares not attack or cannot break through. Therefore, those skilled in attack make it impossible for the enemy to know how to defend; those skilled in defense make it impossible for the enemy to know how to attack. Subtle! Subtle beyond all form; mysterious! Mysterious beyond all sound. Thus one becomes the master of the enemy’s fate.
When advancing, if the enemy cannot resist, it is because one strikes at its weaknesses; when withdrawing, if the enemy cannot pursue, it is because one retreats with speed. If I wish to fight, even if the enemy is protected by deep trenches and high walls, it must come out to engage me, because I attack what it must defend. If I do not wish to fight, even if I merely draw a line on the ground and hold it, the enemy cannot engage me, because I have altered its line of advance.
Therefore, by displaying false appearances, one deceives the enemy and induces it to reveal its intentions, while oneself remains formless and inscrutable. In this way, one can concentrate one’s own forces while forcing the enemy to disperse. When my forces are concentrated in one place and the enemy’s are divided into many, I can use ten times the strength against them, creating a situation where I am many and the enemy is few. By striking with superiority against inferiority, the enemy I engage directly will be few.
The place I intend to attack must be unknown to the enemy. If it is unknown, the enemy must prepare everywhere; and when it prepares everywhere, its forces are scattered. The more places the enemy defends, the fewer forces it can deploy at any single point.
Thus, if the enemy strengthens its front, its rear will be weak; if it strengthens its rear, its front will be weak; if it strengthens its left, its right will be weak; if it strengthens its right, its left will be weak. If it strengthens everywhere, it will be weak everywhere. The enemy’s weakness comes from being forced to guard against many threats; my strength comes from forcing the enemy to divide its forces against me.
If one can foresee where and when a battle will take place, one can march a thousand li to engage the enemy. If one cannot foresee the place or time of battle, then the left cannot support the right, the right cannot support the left, the front cannot support the rear, and the rear cannot support the front—how much more so when distances are great or even just a few li apart?
In my assessment, even if the state of Yue has many troops, what benefit does that bring in determining victory? Therefore, I say that victory can be achieved. Even if the enemy has many troops, it can be prevented from using its full strength.
Thus, one must analyze and assess carefully to understand the enemy’s plans—their strengths and weaknesses; provoke the enemy to observe its patterns of movement; use deception to determine the advantages and disadvantages of its position; and conduct reconnaissance to uncover the reality of its troop dispositions—whether they are strong or weak.
When deception is employed to the utmost subtlety, it leaves no trace; when no trace can be perceived, even hidden spies cannot discern one’s true condition, and even the most intelligent enemy cannot devise a countermeasure.
Victory is achieved by adapting to the enemy’s situation, yet others cannot perceive how it is done. People may see that I win by responding to changing circumstances, but they do not understand how I do so. Therefore, each victory is not a repetition of previous methods, but an adaptation to ever-changing conditions.
The principles of warfare are like water: water flows away from high places and rushes downward; in warfare, one avoids the enemy’s strength and strikes at its weakness. Water shapes its course according to the ground; victory in war is determined by adapting to the enemy. Therefore, there are no fixed methods in warfare, just as water has no constant shape. One who can adapt to the enemy and achieve victory is called a master of warfare.
The principles of warfare are like the natural order: the five elements generate and overcome one another, the four seasons succeed each other, days have length and brevity, and the moon waxes and wanes—everything is in constant change.
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